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VIEWPOINT
ONLINE FIRST
Emergency Preparedness and Public Health
The Lessons of Hurricane Sandy
Tia Powell, MD
Dan Hanfling, MD
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
BEFORE DAWN ON TUESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 30, INthemidst of flooding and damagingwinds fromHur-ricane Sandy, New York University’s (NYU’s) mostfragile patients, premature infants,were carried down
9 flights of stairs in the dark and transported to hospitals on
dry ground.1 Although the infants arrived safely, the mid-
storm evacuation of these critically ill patients was concern-
ing. A safer daylight transfer before flooding overwhelmed
southern Manhattan would have been preferable. The Vet-
erans Affairs (VA) New York Harbor hospital evacuated pa-
tients before the storm.2 Bellevue, New York’s flagship pub-
lic hospital, evacuated patients in the immediate aftermath
of the storm when the backup power supply failed.3,4 These
neighboring hospitals each made different decisions about
when to evacuate. Across the New York City metro region,
many hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities
were evacuated,most of them after the stormhit,making this
the central public health challenge of this calamitous event.
It is a familiar story—a superstorm comes ashore, infra-
structure is overwhelmed, and health care facilities evacuate
patients, with major delays in returning to normal function-
ing. Afterwards, policy makers evaluate lessons learned for
the next disaster, but similarmissteps are often repeated.Why
did some health care facilities with the same risk level evacu-
ate while others did not? Although the 2 storms were differ-
ent in many ways, it is instructive to compare Hurricane Ka-
trina with the still-unfolding events of Sandy.
Success Amidst Failure
The emergencyhospital evacuations of 2 ofManhattan’s land-
mark medical facilities—NYU Langone Medical Center
evacuated 300 patients during the storm, and the next day
Bellevue Hospital evacuated 700 patients—struck a similar
chord to the catastrophic loss of medical infrastructure in
New Orleans in 2005. Ad hoc decisions made in the midst
of crisis cost patients their lives during Katrina and were
second-guessed in the courts.
Unlike during Katrina, New York hospitals during Sandy
had more detailed emergency plans and access to better-
positioned backup generators, many placed on high floors
to protect against flooding. Fuel pumps in some hospitals
were left in basements because of building code restric-
tions but were encased in concrete to protect against floods.
Indeed, NYU engineers prepared the hospital against an un-
precedented 12-ft flood, but not the actual 14 ft that Sandy
delivered, causing pumps to fail.
As a result of post-Katrina planning, New York hospitals
had capabilities tomanage evacuations, demonstrating amea-
sure of success. Hospital staff had transport equipment to
move patientswithin the facility; the federal AmbulanceCon-
tract developed in the wake of Katrina brought 350 addi-
tional ambulances to the city and ensured rapid response
by emergency medical service transport units; the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services deployed more than
1000 disastermedical personnel to assist in the response and
recovery; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) placed urban search and rescue teams nearby as
the storm came ashore.
What seemed to bemissing, however, were clear and con-
sistent criteria to guide evacuation decisions. The Institute
of Medicine (IOM) has stressed the importance of advance
planning and protocols, with the ability to remain flexible
in the face of new information.5
Evacuation decisions are complex—a decision to evacu-
ate prematurely places patients at risk, whereas waiting too
long can have devastating consequences. Hospitals are faced
with a variety of factors, many of which are in tension—
ranging from patient safety and lost revenue to communi-
cation and logistical capabilities. It is impossible to know
the reasoning of hospital administrators during Sandy, but
the VA acted decisively ahead of the storm, while 2 neigh-
boring hospitals evacuated under far-from-ideal circum-
stances—which, in hindsight, appeared to have been the less
optimal choice.
At least 1 New York hospital failed to learn a critical les-
son from Katrina—planning for the transport of physically
disabled or obese patients. Bellevue left 2 overweight pa-
tients sheltering in place6 when elevators failed, although a
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timely preemptive move to a room on a lower floor might
have minimized this risk.
Hospitals receiving evacuees had prepared for surge ca-
pacity. Consistentwith IOMguidance, these hospitals shifted
delivery of care along a continuum fromconventional to con-
tingency response, utilizing facilities to deliver care func-
tionally equivalent to normal operating conditions.5 Hos-
pital lobbies served as patient reception areas, hallways
accommodated patient beds, staff-to-patient ratios changed
so that staff cared for more patients, andmedical documen-
tation requirements were adjusted. These strategies en-
abled hospitals to deliver care in a severely affected city.
Common Failures
The difficult lessons learned from Katrina did not result in
hardened medical facilities capable of withstanding cata-
strophic flooding. Joint Commission accreditation stan-
dards updated after Katrina were designed to enable facili-
ties to function alone for 96 hours, emphasizing backup
power generation resistant to flooding and monthly capa-
bility tests. Yet these recommendations proved insuffi-
cient. Hospitals rarely placed their own vulnerabilities at the
center of mandated disaster exercises, in part because of the
ongoing need to provide patient care.
In the aftermath of Sandy, hospitals were unable to en-
sure continuity of operations, which is a hallmark of suc-
cessful disaster plans. The Joint Commission urged the
redesign of infrastructure for future hospital construction
but considered retrofitting existing infrastructure cost-
prohibitive. The latest disaster in New York City should re-
open discussion regarding needed investments. The cost-
benefit calculusmust include the long-term impacts. Delayed
reoccupancy of storm-damaged facilities has major public
health implications, including limited access to care, finan-
cial strain on local facilities, and stress on regional health
care systems that must accommodate the loss of medical
capacity.
Both Katrina and Sandy highlighted the difficulty in at-
taining “situational awareness”—thedata and insights needed
to make strategic planning and response decisions. Loss of
communications due to power failures, combined with in-
accessibility to affected communities, caused delay in rec-
ognizing the fragile state of nursing homes, assisted living
facilities, and hospitals. Public health authorities did not take
charge to coordinate strategic decisions. Notably, before the
storm, hospitals assured the mayor that “they were ready
for whatever comes.”7
The Future of Emergency Preparedness
Natural disasters are chaotic. Leaving crucial decisions to
health care facilities results in inconsistent action, poten-
tially adverse to patient and public interests. Public health
and emergency management agencies should develop pro-
tocols, ensure capacity, and guide crucial decisions in a di-
saster. Public officials, in collaborationwith facilities, should
decide whether to shelter in place or risk transfer of fragile
patients. The secretary of Health andHuman Services should
consider issuing an early public health emergency declara-
tion to reduce legal concerns and regulatory constraints.
Investments to strengthen health care infrastructure to
withstand catastrophic events may seem unrealistic under
current fiscal restraints. However, the financial and public
health consequences of failing to invest will result in pre-
dictable hospital failures in the next disaster. Where pos-
sible, investments should be coordinated acrossmultiple in-
stitutions, using health care coalitions to ensure resiliency.
For example, a joint venture linking neighboring Manhat-
tan hospitals with shared equipment, supplies, infrastruc-
ture, and trainingwould yield significant financial and health
advantages. Although there are major barriers to coopera-
tion among private, city, and federal authorities, harmoni-
zation of planning and response is essential to ensure pa-
tient safety.
Facilities will require additional resources—financial, ma-
terial, and intellectual—to meet the challenges of disaster
response. Investments should help ensure the operation of
health care services during and after a disaster. Communi-
ties cannot avoid natural and man-made disasters, and the
next event could be still more catastrophic. Federal, state,
and municipal authorities can better prepare for the next
disaster and have a duty to do so.
Published Online: November 16, 2012. doi:10.1001/jama.2012.108940
Conflict of Interest Disclosures: All authors have completed and submitted the
ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest. Dr Hanfling reported
receipt of payment for consultancy from Booz Allen Hamilton and for lectures/
speakers bureaus fromNew Jersey Hospital Association. No other disclosures were
reported.
Additional Contributions:We acknowledge the contributions of Bruce Altevogt,
PhD, Board on Health Sciences Policy at the IOM, for assistance.
REFERENCES
1. Kolker R. A hospital flatlined: inside theNYULangoneMedical Center evacuation.
New YorkMagazine. November 3, 2012. http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/11
/hospital-flatlined-inside-the-nyu-evacuation.html. Accessed November 14, 2012.
2. Goodbye Sandy. http://www.nyharbor.va.gov/features/goodbyesandy.asp. Ac-
cessed November 7, 2012.
3. Shapiro J, Mays J. Bellevue Hospital Evacuated After 2 Days on Emergency
Generators. http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20121031/kips-bay
/bellevue-hospital-evacuated-after-two-days-on-emergency-generators. Ac-
cessed November 8, 2012.
4. Hartocollis A, Bernstein N. At Bellevue, a desperate fight to ensure the pa-
tients’ safety. New York Times. November 1, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/11/02/nyregion/at-bellevue-a-desperate-fight-to-ensure-the-patients-safety
.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed November 14, 2012.
5. Institute ofMedicine. Crisis Standards of Care: A Systems Framework for Cata-
strophic Disaster Response. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2012.
6. Ofri D. The storm and the aftermath [published online November 14, 2012].
N Engl J Med. doi: 10.1056/NEJMp1213843.
7. Katz C. Mayor Bloomberg Update on Hurricane Sandy Storm Prep: Don’t Be
Complacent, NYC. October 27, 2012. http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs
/dailypolitics/2012/10/mayor-bloomberg-update-on-hurricane-sandy-storm
-prep-dont-be-complacent-nyc. Accessed November 8, 2012.
VIEWPOINT
E2 JAMA, Published online November 16, 2012 ©2012 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.
